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CORPORATE POINT MEN AND THE CREATION
OF THE MONTANA CENTRAL RAILROAD,

1882 .. 87

WILLIAM L. LANG
On 21 November 1887, a crowd jammed
Ming's Opera House in Helena, Montana, to
celebrate the completion of the Montana Central Railway, a branch line of the St. Paul,
Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway. Sharing the
Opera House stage that day were railroad executives and managers from the East, Montana
politicians, and local businessmen. Their reason for celebration was three-fold. First, because
Montalaans had struggled for more than a decade to get rail connections, sometimes nearly
making unwise and unnecessary deals with railroad corporations, getting a railroad to build
through Montana was cause for celebration.

Second, the Montana Central brought with it
the promise of breaking an oppressive rail agreement that had weighed heavily on Montana.
The Union Pacific, which had built to Butte
in 1881, and the Northern Pacific, which had
completed its transcontinental road through
Helena in 1883, had concocted a rate pool
agreement that set artificially high freight rates.
Third, the completion of the Montana Central
ended a bitter economic and political war that
had divided businessmen and split up political
alliances within the city.!
The crowd at Ming's had these developments
in their minds as they clapped and cheered at
the speechmakers. But they turned their primary focus on James Jerome Hill, the fortynine-year-old president of the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway, the man who
had brought the Montana Central to Helena.
Just emerging as a major player in railroad development in the Northwest, Hill brought with
him a reputation as a man of capital, power,
and corporate success. It was a reputation that
often elicited fear among westerners because he
was one of those distant financial and political
power brokers who seemingly controlled Montana's fate. But he also had a reputation as a
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FIG. 1. In 1886, the Montana Central had been completed from the main line of the Manitoba at Great Falls to
Helena. The line to Rimini and the Red Mountain mines was built by the Northern Pacific. Map by George Cram,

1886, courtesy of Montana Historical Society.

dynamic and manipulative entrepreneur who
had brought essential rail connections to the
isolated northern territories. The Montana
Central was Hill's first penetration of the Montana market, but the railway would gain even
more significance when Hill completed the rest
of the Manitoba's mainline across the statethe new transcontinental Great Northern Railway that would be completed in 1893 and connect St. Paul with Puget Sound. 2
The Great Northern Railway was both dream
and goal in his mind as Hill stood before the
appreciative crowd, but still he had reason to
boast in 1887. His Manitoba railway had built

643 miles across Dakota and Montana, setting
a record for track-laying in a single season and
bringing relief to Montana shippers who had
suffered under the UP -NP rate pool agreement. 3
The crowd cheered when Hill listed the
achievements, but their loudest ovations came
when he tipped his hat to his Montana associates on the opera house stage, his point men
in building the Montana Central. 4 They were
men of influence in Montana, men who understood business and had political savvy. Principal
among them were Territorial Delegate Martin
Maginnis, Great Falls founder Paris Gibson, and
freighting entrepreneur Charles A. Broadwater.
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THE POINT MEN

Not unlike a general with his cavalry officers,
Hill used his point men for intelligence reports,
suggestions on tactics, and reactions to overall
strategies. Hill provided the power of corporate
investment and decision making, while the point
men prepared the ground in Montana between
1884 and 1888, the critical years of the Manitoba's extension into the Territory. Hill was a
veteran of successful corporate teamwork and
he understood its importance; he had benefited
enormously from his early associations with the
aggressive entrepreneurs, Norman Kittson,
Donald Smith, George Stephen, and John S.
Kennedy, who together had created the Manitoba road during the late 1870s. 5 Hill listened
to his financial partners-Stephen, Smith,
Kennedy, Edward Nichols, Samuel Thome,

Greenleaf Clark, and others-who invested in
his schemes and served as a quasi board of directors. They questioned his plans in Montana,
advised him on how to organize complementary
corporations, and devised critically important
strategies for selling bond issues. He especially
relied on Kennedy, who carefully monitored developments in St. Paul and Helena from his
office in New York. The Hill-Kennedy combination, as Albro Martin has put it, was "the
strongest railroad team in the Northwest."6
It was the western end of Hill's transcontinental team, however, that had the most profound effect on Manitoba's fortunes. In ways
that Montanans and Hill could not have anticipated, the point men took on the brunt of
the tough work of railroad building on the frontier. That work pushed these point men to their
financial and political limits, forCing them to

FIG. 2. By 1891, the Manitoba had become the Great Northern Railway and the Montana Central extended through
Helena to Butte. Map from the Second Annual Report of the Great Northern Railway Company, 1891, courtesy of

Montana Historical Society.
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way bill that would open Dakota and Montana
Indian reservations to transit by the Manitoba
road. 10
Maginnis had been one of several Demo,
cratic politicians in Montana, including Wil,
liam A. Clark, Marcus Daly, Samuel T. Hauser
(Fig. 4), and Charles Broadwater, who had aI,
lied themselves with key Republicans to pro'
mote a general economic development of the
Territory. Montana's political leadership during
the territorial period split on many issues while
maintaining a "no,party" structure and govern,
ing by coalitions. Throughout politicians agreed
that the first interest was economic and general
development of the territory. In addition, Ma,
ginnis and Hauser had developed strong ties
with other western Democrats who were inter,
ested in economic development, notably Sen,
ator George Vest of Missouri. 11 For Democrat
and entrepreneur Hill, these political connec,
tions were essential if he expected to launch
new industries in a far,flung territory. In that
effort, one man spanned both the industrial and
the political and became Hill's primary point
man in the territory-Charles A. Broadwater.
Charles A. Broadwater (Fig. 5). Broadwater
came to Montana in 1862, a twenty,one year
old with some experience in mercantile busi,
nesses in St. Louis and an eagerness to pursue
the main chance. Buying and selling cattle and
horses led naturally to freighting and within a
few years he operated the Diamond R freight
outfit, which secured lucrative government
contracts during the 1870s. Through his con,
nections with businessmen like A. H. Wilder
of St. Paul and with political support from Ter,
ritorial Delegate Maginnis, Broadwater landed
a series of contracts to build and supply military
posts in Montana, bringing him substantial
wealth. By the early 1880s, Broadwater had in,
terests in a dozen or more businesses and had
organized the Montana National Bank in Hel,
ena, again with Wilder's help. It was probably
through Wilder that Broadwater first met Hill,
perhaps as early as 1876. 12
By 1883 Broadwater had drifted away from
an earlier alliance with Sam Hauser and eagerly
joined Gibson's chorus to convince Hill to ex,

FIG. 4. Samuel T. Hauser. Photo courtesy of Mon,
tana Historical Society.

tend the Manitoba westward to Montana and
thereby break up the NP,UP transportation
agreement. His split with Hauser began in mid,
1882, shortly after he opened his national bank
in Helena. The Broadwater,Wilder comb ina'
tion, which also included Territorial Governor
Benjamin F. Potts and Russell B. Harrisonson of Senator and later president Benjamin
Harrison-threatened Hauser. He scrambled to
retain his own bank's profitable account with
the Northern Pacific by cementing his rela,
tionship with NP vice president T. F. Oakes,
which tied him even more to the NP and would
soon put him at further odds with Broadwater. 13
These were momentous developments in
Montana. Economic competition had dissolved
the pragmatic alliance between Republicans
Potts and Harrison, and Democrats Hauser,
Broadwater, and Maginnis but its effects spilled
over into politics. By widening an already de,
veloping division among Montana Democrats,
these antagonisms between the Broadwater and
Hauser factions disrupted the connections
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Montana's democracy had with national party
leaders. In Montana, echoes of the split would
reverberate for more than two decades and rna,
terially affect the fortunes of Hauser, Maginnis,
W. A. Clark, and Marcus Daly. 14 For Hill, these
developments represented an opening in Mon,
tana, as Broadwater and Maginnis inclined away
from Hauser and the Northern Pacific and to'
ward him and the Manitoba. 15
Aggressive, intelligent, and known for keep,
ing his own counsel--one newspaper called him
"not much of a cackler"-Broadwater would
prove to be Hill's most effective agent in Mon,
tana. In many ways it was a natural combina,
tion. Both men were enamored of the bold public
statement while harboring few if any political
aspirations; both worked efficiently and stealth,
ily through corporate agreements, and both
understood that loyalty in finance and politics
extended only as long as mutual interests were
served. It is likely that Hill first learned of
Broadwater's interest in developing northern
Montana through Wilder and Maginnis, when
Broadwater urged the opening of Indian reser,
vation land to settlement in 1881. As chief
contractor and post sutler at northern Mon,
tana's Fort Assinniboine, Broadwater realized
that the region north of the Missouri River was
the best area in the territory for new railroad
development. It would open up a vast region
and coincidentally aid his business interests. 16

HILL COMES To MONTANA

At first Gibson was cautious about the am,
bitious and somewhat secretive Broadwater, who
had risen quickly in Montana and had devel,
oped connections with eastern financiers and
politicians. By June 1884, however, Gibson
joined with Broadwater in hosting Hill and a
company of engineers on a fast,paced tour of
resource properties in Montana. 17 In four days,
Broadwater whisked Hill and his men to mining
properties near Helena, to Butte, and to Great
Falls, Fort Benton, and the recently discovered
coal properties at Sand Coulee in the Belt
Mountains near Great Falls. Montana's press
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FIG. 5. Charles A. Broadwater. Photo courtesy of
Montana Historical Society.

buzzed with reports, as Hill's party bounced over
rough stage roads from location to location.
Would Hill extend the Manitoba? Would he
build to Fort Benton-to Helena-to Butte?
The Butte Miner claimed to have intercepted a
message from Gibson that confirmed Hill's
promise to build the Manitoba to Great Falls;
the Deer Lodge New Northwest speculated about
Hill's involvement in a newly organized Sand
Coulee Coal Company; and Fort Benton's River
Press quoted Hill on the spot: "You can say,"
Hill told the paper, "that I think favorably of
the proposed road from Helena to Fort Ben'
ton."18
Prominent in Hill's thinking about Mon,
tana, aside from his two,year,old interest in the
Great Falls townsite speculation, were the min'
ing properties at Red Mountain near Helena
and the coal deposits at Sand Coulee. The Red
Mountain mines were in the rich Boulder Bath,
olith that included Hauser's profitable silver
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mines south of Helena and Tommy Cruse's spectacular Drumlummon goldmine north of Helena. Early reports from Broadwater's mining
engineers suggested that the Red Mountain
properties might be the richest of the lot. After
looking over the Sand Coulee coal field, Hill
was sufficiently impressed with the results of
Broadwater's early tests to contract with J. S.
Newberry of the Columbia School of Mines to
inspect Sand Coulee and Red Mountain deposits. Newberry's report confirmed Broadwater's boasts. 19
At the heart of Hill's plans for Montana,
however, was the construction of an industrial
railroad, one that would link Great Falls and
adjacent coal fields with Butte. The Montana
Central would ship coal to Butte, Butte copper
matte to a future Great Falls smelter, and Red
Mountain precious metals to the Manitoba
mainline at Great Falls for shipment. Hill chose
Broadwater to quarterback the development of
his investments in Montana and to head the
Montana Central.
CONFLICT WITH THE NORTHERN PACIFIC

A constant element in Broadwater's work on
Hill's behalf in Montana was the enmity of the
Northern Pacific. That animosity had simmered
for years and had developed from both railroads'
beliefthat the other had invaded their territory:
the NP claimed Montana, while the Manitoba
claimed the Red River valley. 20 Using telegrams
sent in code, Broadwater kept Hill apprised of
the latest feints and tactical actions by NP managers in Montana. Hill, in turn, relayed the
information to Kennedy and other financiers
before devising overall strategies. Between 1885,
when Hill's group began planning for significant
investment in Montana, and the completion of
the Montana Central to Butte in 1888, the NP
and Manitoba forces contested each other on
several fronts. 21
The conflict between the NP and the Manitoba became politically explosive in mid-1885,
when Hauser captured the territorial governor's
spot in a bitter fight with Maginnis. Broadwater
and Hill supported Maginnis, while Territorial

Delegate Joseph K. Toole and Missouri's Senator George Vest supported Hauser. The split
was now complete and tinged with political bitterness. Broadwater, for example, had gone so
far as to charge that Hauser had contributed to
the Republicans during the 1884 presidential
campaign. 22
CONTROL OF THE RED MOUNTAIN MINES

In the competition that mattered most-the
economic one-a significant prize was control
of the Red Mountain mines. That contest can
serve here as a case study of the intricate and
effective relationship Hill had with his point
man in Helena. Located fifteen miles west of
Helena up Ten Mile Creek, the mines had first
been coveted by investors associated with the
NP when Hauser, Maginnis, and Broadwater
had hoped the NP would build a branch line
to the area.23 Hauser had urged the NP to act
quickly and company vice president Oakes had
responded in early 1884, writing Hauser that
"there will be no difficulty in building Ten Mile
branch." But nothing materialized. By midyear
Broadwater and other Hill associates made their
move, investing in the Ten Mile district and
planning a rail line to serve the mines. Broadwater enlisted the help of Helena mining engineer John Longmaid and Butte mining expert
Thomas Couch. Throughout 1884 and 1885,
Longmaid and Couch tunneled into Red Mountain claims and sent their reports to Broadwater.
First secretly buying up claims and then disguising their connection with Hill's interests,
Broadwater maneuvered in Helena financial
circles to tie up the best claims. 24
Broadwater played a secretive game, purchasing blocks of Red Mountain claims and
passing on the results of mineral tests to Hill,
who kept abreast of developments. "Have they
cut into the Lexington [mine] on lower level,"
Hill queried Broadwater in October 1885, "and
if so what was the thickness?" Encouraged by
what he learned from Broadwater, Hill had already factored these mining properties into his
planned investment in Montana by mid-December. Meanwhile, St. Paul and Montana pa-
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pers speculated about ownership of the mines,
the amount invested, and when a railroad would
be built to the mines. 25
In the Red Mountain business, Broadwater
had an advantage that must have frustrated
Hauser's group. In 1873, he had married Julia
Chumasero, daughter of a prominent Republican lawyer and political ally of Wilbur F. Sanders and other NP supporters. Not only had
Broadwater married into what became the other
camp a decade later, but he also had an inside
line on the purchase of Chumasero's Red Mountain properties, reportedly the best claims in the
district. So by early 1886, Broadwater had delivered to Hill a handsome group of mining
properties and an opportunity to build a paying
rail line smack in the heart of NP territory. 26
NP managers privately fumed and publicly
questioned what Hill intended in Montana.
Prohibited by their charter from building branch
lines, the NP had to create separate companies
to build branches. Writing as governor of Montana Territory in mid-January 1886, Hauser told
NP executives that although he would encourage the building of any road that brought investment to Montana, he urged them to act
quickly. But the NP dallied too long. Hill hired
away one of the NP's finest engineers, Joseph
T. Dodge, and sent him to Helena to work
under Broadwater's keen direction. 27
As Dodge went out to survey the line and
pick the best route, trouble developed in Helena. On 16 January 1886 Broadwater disclosed
to Hill, "I have always had some fears that the
NP or its agents might get in ahead of us and
give us some serious trouble." Broadwater told
Hill that Maginnis had pumped T. C. Power,
a wealthy Republican businessman with ties to
the NP, about the NP's plan to build their own
line up Ten Mile Creek and he got bad news.
Broadwater immediately had his attorneys,
Chumasero and Chadwick, look over the legalities of branch line building in Montana,
telling Hill: "If they [NP] organize ahead of us
they would have decidedly the best of us, in
fact they would have rights." Act now, he
warned Hill: "We have paid out so much money
now that I do not deem it wise to jeopardize it
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by any delay. "28
While this drama over the Red Mountain
line was beginning, Broadwater and Hill tipped
their larger plans by chartering the Montana
Central Railway, the road that would connect
Butte with Great Falls and the Manitoba mainline. The wording of the charter described their
claim to a right-of-way "from a point one mile
east of junction of the NP ... to some point
near the northeasterly corner of [Lewis and
Clark] county." Although the general public
might have missed the point, the NP knew that
Broadwater's facile description of the "northeasterly corner" meant Great Falls. The charter
also included a right-of-way for a branch line
to Red Mountain. A few weeks later Broadwater
and his associates also incorporated the Red
Mountain Consolidated Mining Company to
exploit the thirty-eight lodes of the Chumasero
claims. It was a fast start for Hill's foray into
Montana. 29
In many respects, Hill's investments in Montana were only as safe as Broadwater's intelligence and energy. As executive head of both
the mining and railway companies, Broadwater
directed engineer Dodge to survey the Ten Mile
line and the Montana Central line north from
Helena to Great Falls while he contended with
the NP's challenge to their new enterprises and
oversaw mining operations. In at least one instance he had to put the whip to Dodge: "I find
he is very much inclined to have his own way
about things," Broadwater informed Hill. "He
delayed our maps at least 3 days and would not
have had them yet if I had not given him positive orders to put 2 more engineers on them."
Hill worried that without a map filed with territorial officials the incorporation of the railroad
would be in jeopardy. As it turned out, such
was not the case. It was the NP, however, that
worried Broadwater most. As Hill put it to
Broadwater, "I do not think our NP friends entirely enjoy your enterprise. "30
CONTROLLlNG ROUTES

AND FINANCES

In mid-February 1886, Hauser went to New
York to drum up support for NP branch lines
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from Helena to Butte and Helena to the Red
Mountain mines. Rumors of his success in organizing a syndicate floated through St. Paul
and Helena. One of Hill's financial partners in
New York, Samuel Thome, warned him to
"move very quickly" in Montana. But R. B. Harrison, a Hill and Broadwater confidant, was not
so sure. Telegraphing Broadwater on 20 February, Harrison thought that the rumors were a
"possible bluff to compromise territory with
you-watch and move quickly." Meanwhile
Broadwater went to St. Paul to confer with Hill.
From Helena, Maginnis confirmed on 23 February that rumors were flying there. Writing to
Broadwater in St. Paul, Maginnis repeated public statements that Wilbur Sanders had made
on behalf of the NP, testing the waters with
promises of branch lines. But Maginnis downplayed the incident, writing that "nearly everyone here construe [it) as a big bluff." Sanders
"got no sympathy," Maginnis reported to
Broadwater; "the whole town is with you."
While Maginnis reassured St. Paul, the Montana Central managers in Helena moved to keep
their advantage. William Harrison-a Manitoba man who had gone to Helena to be secretary of the Montana Central-fired off a
telegram on 24 February to Broadwater and Hill
in St. Paul: "have deeds on record or contractors
in possession all critical points to and including
mouth canyon Red Mt. Branch. Dodge not returned. Enemy invisible." Explaining further,
Harrison wrote that "Hauser's championship of
the N.P. is strongly deprecated [in Helena] ....
I don't think they can follow Ten Mile Creek
unless they . . . use our roadbed through the
passes. "31
Broadwater and his men had moved quickly,
but had they been quick enough? Once he had
returned to Helena and surveyed the situation
Broadwater became convinced that the NP ploy
was all bluff. Nonetheless he kept agitating
against Hauser and the NP and threatened to
call the matter before the Helena Board of Trade,
a commercial club, to get "leading merchants
to withdraw their patronage from N. P. and ship
by U.P. until we get to Benton when they will
use water route and our rails." Broadwater also

planted embarrassing stories in Helena newspapers, further stirring the issue. As Broadwater
had hoped, Hauser began to hear from his Montana allies. Hauser's banking partner, A. ]. Davis
of Butte, warned Hauser that the conflict with
the Montana Central "was raising havoc with
the bank" and if Hauser did not desist he would
"kill himself politically." Talking with Broadwater about the situation, Davis assured him
that Butte would fight for the Montana Central
because they wanted access to Great Falls coal.
This news helped further allay Broadwater's
worries about Hauser and the NP, but he steamed
at what he considered Hauser's audacity. Hill
himself worried that Broadwater might do something foolish. Broadwater assured him: "I have
been extremely cautious to say nothing that
would antagonize them," but it was clear that
Broadwater had reached his limit. "While I dislike to make war on anyone," he wrote to Hill
in a plaintive tone in early March, "the sooner
we put him [Hauser] down the less trouble we
will have in the future. He never put a dollar
into Red Mountain, we did, and now he is
trying to ruin our investment." Among his suggestions, Broadwater thought that spreading
embarrassing news about Hauser in New York
to ruin his credibility with financiers might be
a good plan. 32
The situation concerned Hill, but removed
as he was from the scratching talons and flying
feathers in Helena he moved with more deliberation to settle the issue with the NP. At Hill's
direction, Manitoba general manager Allen
Manvel met with Oakes and NP president Robert Harris in New York in mid-March. In response to questions about Hill's plans in
Montana, Manvel disingenuously-and evidently with a straight face-told Oakes and
Harris that the Montana Central was a private
operation and not connected with the Manitoba in any way and that "if it [Montana Central] was to be sold [Hill] had expressed a
willingness to let the Northern Pacific have the
first chance at it." Probably dumbfounded and
certainly angry, Oakes was not fooled by Manvel's explanation. He reacted caustically, scolding Manvel and telling him to deliver a message
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to Hill: Oakes considered the Montana Central
an unwarranted Manitoba invasion into NP territory and the Manitoba could expect the worst
from this. Manvel left the meeting certain that
the NP planned to build the Red Mountain line
and certain that the NP fully expected Hill to
extend the Manitoba to Montana. 33

BUILDING QUICKLY

The NP "bluff" had suddenly become real.
As the conflict in Helena continued to foam
during March, Hill urged Broadwater to move
quickly. "I am satisfied that the N.P. are greatly
alarmed at Montana Central . . . and will do
everything in their power to head it off." He
instructed Broadwater: "work fully and . . .
crowd the grading as fast as you can. I expect
to have 3,000 tons of rails, with splices and
spikes, ready to ship to you within two or three
weeks." A hard push, Hill believed, would put
the Montana Central line so close to finishing
during the summer of 1886 that building the
Red Mountain branch could proceed immediately. Hill's financial partners-especially
Thome and Kennedy-agreed. 34 Writing to Hill
on 30 March, Kennedy sent in his order for 300
blocks of shares in Montana Ceptral stock and
assured Hill: "I am quite sure you need apprehend no trouble from parties connected with
the Northern Pacific Railroad. "35
What Kennedy and Hill knew, as Hill told
Broadwater, was that while the NP might try
to harass the Montana Central there was not
time for them meet the legal requirements allowing them to condemn property for their Red
Mountain line. Broadwater had beaten them to
the ground. "We are so far ahead of them,"
Broadwater had written Hill, "they [NPl would
not believe it. "36 Keeping on the offensive,
Broadwater fed a news story to Associated Press
in New York through R. B. Harrison that sought
to embarrass Hauser in Helena. But the NP had
no intention of giving up the fight. Throughout
the next several months, their surveying crews
contested Broadwater's men along the Ten Mile
route.
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CLAIMING THE ROUTE

The issue was joined in a particularly narrow
canyon where NP engineers forcefully tried to
impede the grading. Broadwater appealed to the
court for an injunction to halt the NP, arguing
that the Montana Central had occupied the
ground and had prior right to the grade. The
Montana Central got the injunction, which was
upheld by the Montana Supreme Court in late
1886, forcing the NP to find another grade and
to complete full legal requirements before condemning property along their line. 37
The deadlock had been broken, at least for
the time. The Montana Central crews continued to prepare the grade to Rimini, the terminus
of the line, while Chief Engineer Adna Anderson of the NP located another line through
the narrow defile at the canyon mouth. Broadwater and Hill could have breathed with some
relief, but the NP was still determined to make
the Manitoba's entry into Montana expensive.
Knowing that Hill planned to ship his rails
for the Montana Central over their line, the
NP charged a high rate-$35 per ton-and refused to ship at the $20 rate Hill requested. The
NP's obstinance, plus other discourtesies such
as denying pro forma passes for Montana Central officials, confirmed Hill's view of the NP's
management, which he had long considered
idiosyncratic and shortsighted. After discussions with Broadwater and his financial partners, Hill decided to press forward with the
Manitoba's extension to Montana and carry the
rails themselves. They would lay them down
during the 1887 season. 38
At a gala held at the Grand Central Hotel
in September 1886 in his honor, Hill told Helenans that the NP's exorbitant freight rates had
delayed the Montana Central, but the road
would be completed to Helena by autumn 1887.
And, he reminded his audience, they would get
a bonus. The Montana Central's connection
with the Manitoba in Great Falls would give
Helena shippers a faster route to St. Paul.
Standing before the group, Hill jabbed the NP
as he read from a Northern Pacific timetable
some jokester had placed under each dinner
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plate. Hill told the group that the NP was twelve
hours too slow; the Manitoba would serve them
better and faster. 39
BEST ROUTE

To BUTTE

As much as Hill genuinely reveled in the
Montana Central's successful pursuit of the Red
Mountain line and surveying the Helena-toGreat Falls route, the ultimate destination and
payoff for the Montana Central was Butte.
Broadwater long before had convinced Hill that
the Butte connection would guarantee that the
Montana Central would be a paying road. In
late April 1886, Broadwater reported to Hill
that Daly had confirmed that earlier evaluation.
"Daily [sic] says Butte is in her infancy," Broadwater wrote Hill, "and will work 5 tons of ore
where she is working one now. If so, the road
from Butte to the falls value is unknown. So I
think we had better fight it out on our line if
it takes all summer. "40
The fight Broadwater anticipated was again
with the NP. Hauser had been after the NP
managers for years to invest in an extension of
the Wickes branch (built in 1883-84) to Butte,
and it seemed they were now ready to proceed.
Hill and Broadwater knew they would be in a
race with the NP to run the first survey line to
Butte, so they put the best man they could hire
into the field. Discoverer of the Canadian Pacific's route through the seemingly impregnable
Selkirk Mountains in British Columbia, A. B.
Rogers came to Helena in early May with instructions from Hill to find a route to Butte and
to keep his purpose confidential. 41 Rogers struggled through heavy snow drifts in mid-May,
reporting to Hill that he had found a line "at
a grade not exceeding 116' per mile." Nearly
one month later, Rogers could report to Broadwater "I have succeeded in getting a line. . . .
I will call on you for that box of cigars . . ."
Rogers had staked out the ground to Butte ahead
of the NP. As Rogers wrote Hill in August, "I
know you have the best route the country affords, and the present efforts in the field will
assure the possession of it to you. "42

While Rogers had been in the field, claiming
the best line in the steep and broken gulches
between Helena and Butte, Broadwater had been
busy in Helena, purchasing depot property and
staking out potential sites for a smelter on the
city's south side,43 The NP had also been busy,
incorporating their Helena, Boulder Valley &
Butte Railroad Company, surveying their line
to Butte, and estimating the costs. But Broadwater was confident that he had beaten them.
One of his engineers had intercepted the NP
contractor's grading estimates, which disclosed
that the Montana Central had taken the best
ground, forcing the NP to run their line with
"a very large amount of curvature [with] ...
numerous high trestles." The costs to the NP
of building from Helena to Butte, Broadwater
realized, would be prohibitive. 44
CONCLUSION

Broadwater had delivered on his promises
and Hill had a secured road from Great Falls to
Butte. What remained to be done by the Hill
forces in late 1886 to make the Manitoba's extension and the Montana Central's building a
reality is another story, too long to detail here.
The arena was Washington and the prize was a
right-of-way across Indian reservations in Dakota and Montana. Successful lobbying by Maginnis and others had brought out a bill to open
the Indian reservations to white settlement, but
President Grover Cleveland stunned Hill and
his colleagues by vetoing the measure in July
1886. Hill, Broadwater, Maginnis, Kennedy,
and others applied more pressure and Hill finally
got his right-of-way in 1887. 45
There were more fights with the Northern
Pacific over the Red Mountain and Butte lines.
And there were scraps in Helena, including a
desperate harassment just days before the last
mile of track was spiked down south of town.
In a final gesture of spite, the NP laid track
across the Montana Central's right-of-way,
where it crossed over the NP's grade. The NP
parked one of their locomotives on the spot,
threatening to force the Montana Central into
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court to get the NP engine off their line. Cooler
heads in the NP organization ordered the tracks
taken up in time for the completion of the Montana Central, but it was testimony to the continuing enmity of the two roads in Montana,
an enmity that prevailed until the signing of
the London Agreement in 1896. 46
Despite the ongoing competition with the
NP, Hill would achieve most of his goals in
Montana after the completion of the Montana
Central. The first trains to Butte arrived in 1888,
and within two years Butte ore was being shipped
over the Montana Central to a smelter in Paris
Gibson's industrial city on the Missouri. Hill
also built branch lines to the Sand Coulee and
Belt coal fields and a major feeder line north
to Canada, but despite the effort on the Red
Mountain line the Manitoba abandoned the effort and let the NP build to Rimini.
Meanwhile, the NP did not complete the
too expensive Helena-to-Butte line, opting to
build directly west to Butte from Three Forks.
An NP-sponsored company did build a line to
the Drumlummon mine at Marysville, but none
of their building seriously damaged the Montana Central. Hauser got his extension of the
Wickes branch in 1887, even though he decided the next year to build a new silver and
lead smelter next to the NP mainline east of
Helena, a smelter that still operates today and
is one of only a few remaining lead smelters in
North America.
Throughout it all, Hill's point men in Montana had done their job. Gibson had attracted
investment and settlement in Great Falls and
Maginnis had done his work well in Washington and among Montana politicos. Broadwater
had been the most involved and the most successful. But what had happened to Montana in
the process? There are always two sides to any
ledger and it was no different in this case. The
corporate war in Montana left stains. The effort
that had taken so much of Broadwater's time
was part of a longer and larger battle over control of investment, the sources of that investment, and the colonialization of the American
frontier by interests east of the Plains. The corporate managers used the power of investment
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to gain advantage on the frontier, often employing the energy and creativity of their point
men.
In Montana, as elsewhere, the railroad wars
corrupted and disrupted territorial politics. The
battle between Broadwater and Hauser split the
Democratic Party in Montana and soon became
a scene in a broader political struggle that pitted
Helena against Anaconda in the fight over the
permanent location of the state capital and
erupted in the estrangement and then open hostility between copper barons Marcus Daly and
William A. Clark. The content of political dialogue followed the low path outlined by the
corporate struggle. Political alliances were made
to acquire local economic advantage that could
be enlisted to aid in the ongoing corporate battle. The point men brought all of it home and
allowed the corporate managers to wage their
disputes on Montana's turf. At the conclusion,
Montana's political system suffered, and Hill
and his men moved on to other fields.
These disruptions and dislocations aside, for
most Montanans the completion of the Montana Central and the Manitoba brought enormous gain. The NP-UP rate pool had been
broken, which meant more competitive freight
rates, at least in the short run; within a decade,
however, the railroads had combined to levy
rates Montanans thought were extortionate.
Montana's industrial economy expanded as a
direct result of Hill's foray into the territory,
especially at Great Falls where construction of
a dam across the Missouri, the construction of
a sizable copper smelter, and mining nearby coal
fields made it one of Montana's major industrial
cities within a decade. By connecting Butte to
Great Falls, the Montana Central opened an
industrial corridor along the Continental Divide, which spurred more mining and manufacturing activity and gave the area access to a
national market through the Manitoba line.
Agricultuml development also benefited from
building the Manitoba-Montana Central line.
Whites who had lusted for access to Indian lands
north of the Missouri River got their wish fulfilled, even if meant wholesale theft of Indian
lands in service of the railroad lords. Within
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two decades, agricultural immigrants rushed to
the area served by the Manitoba, constituting
the largest land rush in the history of the northern Plains. Hill's dream of an agricultural feesimple empire of farmers served by his railroad
along the northern tier became a reality when
the homestead boom brought thousands to stake
out dryland farms on the Montana steppes. Hill
spared no effort to encourage settlement along
his line, echoing some of the promotional hyperbole that accompanied the Montana Central
excitement of the 1880s. That great inrush of
settlers radically altered Montana politics in the
twentieth century and led directly to the creation of dozens of new counties and a new constituency that continues to playa major political
role in the state.
Finally, for Helena, the Montana Central
meant an infusion of new capital, as Broadwater
funneled investment from Hill and Hill's financier friends into railroad, real estate, and mining
companies that he managed. It also bolstered
Helena's position in competition with other cities, especially Butte and Daly's Anaconda. So,
for Helenans, there was great reason for rejoicing on that day in November 1887, when the
town feted James J. Hill at the Opera House.
And Broadwater must have been at least a little
bit smug as he heard Hill recount the essence
of Broadwater's service to the Manitoba:
It is now about three years since I first saw
your beautiful mountains and your city [when]
. . . Col. Broadwater, your enterprising citizen, was at that time particularly anxious
that I should come out here to see what a
field there was for railway development, and
when I came here he did not give me any
peace until he had rushed me over the mountains four times, I think, in three days. He
insisted that every stone was a mine; and he
told his story so well that I am half inclined
to believe him rightY
During those three years, Broadwater had told
his story well enough to bring Hill's money to
Helena, to cut his friends in on much of the
opportunity, and to prevail over his rivals. He

had served his interests and what he perceived
to be Helena's and Montana's interests, while
for Hill he became an ultimate operative-a
corporate point man on the western frontier.
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